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A DILEMMA FOR THE DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT 
Robert Northcott 
 
 Abstract 
I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument (‘DA’) runs afoul of epistemic 
intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case 
either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or 
else it is irrelevant. I then explore under what conditions DA can escape this dilemma. 
The discussion turns on several issues that have not been much emphasised in 
previous work on DA: a concern that I label trumping; the degree of uncertainty about 
relevant probability estimates; and the exact sequence in which we integrate DA and 
empirical concerns. I conclude that only given a particular configuration of these 
factors might DA still be of interest. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Doomsday Argument was first presented by astrophysicist Brandon Carter more than 30 
years ago. Since then it has been elaborated and defended by many philosophers and 
scientists. It offers a controversial and strikingly pessimistic prediction about the future of 
humanity based solely on a priori argument. 
 At the heart of DA’s interest is that it gives us reason to modify the predictions that 
we might derive from empirical considerations alone. Depending on the details, this 
modification can be counterintuitive – which fact has been used as a criticism. 
Counterintuitiveness alone, of course, need not derail DA if other considerations tell in its 
favour. But the verdict of other considerations is much contested, so counterintuitiveness 
remains potentially decisive.
1
 In this paper, I present a new example in which DA’s 
counterintuitiveness is much worse than before. 
 DA’s predictions are probabilistic. In usual presentations, the rival probability derived 
from empirical considerations alone is not ‘sharp’.2 More formally, if we take the probability 
value itself to be a random variable that we are seeking to estimate, the probability density 
function for this variable has a high variance. In other words, we are not very confident about 
our estimate. As a result, the degree of counterintuitiveness represented by DA’s proposed 
modification is less easily assessed. In this paper’s new example, by contrast, the empirical 
probability is very sharp. It is therefore a much better test case, as it brings matters to a 
clearer head. In particular, the degree of counterintuitiveness implied by DA modification is 
laid bare. At the heart of the matter will lie an issue not previously emphasised in the DA 
literature, which I label trumping. 
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 This paper remains neutral about other critiques of DA and the replies to them. In effect, it investigates 
whether, even on the assumption that DA survives these other critiques, still it is vulnerable to a new worry. 
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 Here and throughout, probabilities should be understood as rational credences. 
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 In the new example, DA faces a dilemma: either it indeed insists on modifying the 
empirically derived probability, at the cost of a counterintuitiveness that now seems 
unacceptable; or else it can be made consistent with the empirical probability, but only at the 
cost of thereby rendering itself irrelevant precisely because it no longer implies any 
modification. Does this dilemma generalise to other cases? When assessing this, what 
becomes evident is the importance of two further factors: first, the uncertainty mentioned 
above about the empirical probability estimates – among other things I will argue that such 
uncertainty is a necessary condition for DA to be of interest. The second further factor is the 
sequence of analysis – in particular, DA must be interpreted (contrary to what has been the 
usual recommendation) as setting values for the relevant probabilities prior to any empirical 
input at all. 
 Overall, our understanding of the conditions necessary for DA to be of interest is thus 
clarified. At the end, I will assess DA’s standing in this new light. 
 
2. The Doomsday Argument 
Each of us today is roughly the 60 billionth human to be born. Here are two possible figures 
in turn for the total number that ever will be born: 100 billion; and 10 trillion.
3
 Which of 
these is more likely? DA argues that, conditioning on the fact that we are 60 billionth on the 
‘birth list’, and given that we have no a priori reason to think we personally are especially 
likely to be in any particular position on this list, it follows that the 100 billion figure is much 
more likely than the 10 trillion one.
4
 As it were, we are each a ball drawn randomly from an 
urn; the fact that our number is a lowly 60 billion tells in favour of the total number of balls 
in the urn being only 100 billion rather than it being the huge 10 trillion. The punchline is: 
given likely demographic trends, an eventual total of 100 billion implies an eye-catchingly 
early end for humanity – say, in just a couple of centuries. 
 Consider the usual futurology factors: nuclear proliferation, asteroid-detection 
capability, eventual colonization of space, and so on. Taking all these into account might 
yield particular probabilities for the 100 billion and 10 trillion totals – by this means, all 
empirical evidence is incorporated. But, its advocates claim, a priori DA reasoning should 
then lead us subsequently to modify these empirically derived probabilities. In particular, we 
should shift our credence in the direction of early doom. Humanity, watch out! 
 DA is explicitly supported by a flourishing recent literature on observational selection 
effects, i.e. on how, in Nick Bostrom’s words, to correct for biases introduced when our 
evidence has been filtered by the precondition that a suitably positioned observer exists to 
have the evidence in the first place. Observational selection effects are important and their 
recent illumination by epistemologists is welcome.
5
 In this paper I will, in effect, examine 
critically the application of that work to DA. 
 
3. The Asteroid example 
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 Let H1 = the 100 billion hypothesis, H2 = the 10 trillion hypothesis, and O = the observation that we are 60 
billionth in the birth list. Assume that the prior probabilities of H1 and H2 are each 0.5. What is the ratio of their 
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pr(H2).pr(O/ H2).pr(O) = (0.5).(1/100bn) / (0.5).(1/10tn) = 10tn / 100bn = 100. That is, initially H1 and H2 were 
level; but after O, H1 is now 100 times more likely. 
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Imagine that a large asteroid, previously unobserved, is discovered to be heading dangerously 
towards Earth, arriving in just a few days’ time. In particular, astronomers calculate that it has 
a 0.5 probability of colliding with us, the uncertainty being due to measurement imprecision 
regarding its exact path. This probability estimate is based on well-established science and is 
not disputed by any expert in the field. Suppose, further, that any collision would be certain 
to destroy all human life, and moreover that there is no feasible way to avoid it. 
 In the face of this terrifying news, what is now the rational expectation of humanity’s 
future duration? The empirical answer is clear enough – there is a 0.5 probability that 
humanity will last just the few days until the big impact (‘Doom-Now’), and a 0.5 probability 
that it will last however long it would have otherwise. What does DA say? Either it is deemed 
to modify these empirical probabilities; or it is not. The dilemma is that either choice tells 
against it. 
 
4. First horn: the trumping problem 
As per the above, the empirical probability of Doom-Now in Asteroid is 0.5, i.e. just the 
probability of the asteroid indeed striking Earth. As it were, the ‘memory’ of our prior 
credence in Doom-Now is wiped out by the asteroid observation. There is no gradual 
updating; rather, regardless of our starting point, there is an abrupt shift straight to 0.5.
6
 
 One might think there is nothing controversial here. However, arguably DA requires 
that our answer be modified, i.e. that we embrace the first horn of the dilemma. In particular, 
according to DA, a priori considerations show that the expected duration for humanity is 
much greater than just a few days. The probability of Doom-Now should accordingly be 
modified downwards.
7
 That is, DA urges that in the apocalyptic asteroid scenario the 
probability of humanity ending in a few days is less than 0.5, contrary to the astronomers’ 
calculations. (Below, I will return to whether DA should indeed embrace the dilemma’s first 
horn; regardless, it will prove useful to set out now the implications of doing so.) 
 I submit that, so applied, DA’s implications are much more counterintuitive in the 
asteroid case than in the traditional one. The reason is, as noted, that there is much less 
uncertainty concerning the empirically derived probability. That is, we are much more 
confident in the 0.5 estimate of humanity ending in a few days than we were before in the 
probability estimate of our lasting more than a few centuries. The proposed DA adjustment is 
accordingly much more clearly implausible. We can say that it is fully trumped by the 
asteroid observations.
8
 
 Imagine a further update – suppose that after another few hours’ fevered observation 
it was estimated that the asteroid had a 0.75 rather than 0.5 probability of colliding with 
Earth. The previous empirical estimate would now have been trumped in its turn. Should not 
DA’s proposed modification be trumped similarly? And which modification would we take 
more seriously – surely the empirically-based pessimistic one, not the DA-based optimistic 
one? 
 Further troublesome variations arise. Imagine next two large asteroids, one 
approaching Earth as before plus this time a second approaching Mars. Suppose that each’s 
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collision probability is 0.5. A collision with Mars would presumably have minimal impact on 
humanity. As a result, according to DA our predictions in the two cases now diverge, for DA 
modifies our credence that Earth will be impacted but not our credence that Mars will be. So 
we have two situations which, according to all the physical evidence, have identical collision 
probabilities – yet if we follow DA our collision predictions for them will be different. 
 The discomfort can be made yet sharper. Imagine a set-up in which the fate of Earth is 
made dependent on the outcome of a single indeterministic quantum event. Suppose in 
particular that this event will yield, say, either an Up or Down result, each with 0.5 
probability, and that things are so rigged that Up would trigger Earth’s demise while Down 
would spare us. Therefore, at the moment just before the event, Doom-Now has a probability 
of 0.5. Nevertheless DA reasoning would still urge us to reduce our credence in Doom-Now, 
and hence in Up, to less than 0.5, even though that 0.5 value is the direct implication of well-
confirmed physical law.
9
 Thus our credence here would contradict a law of nature. DA 
requires us to believe in miracles. 
 
5. Second horn: the irrelevance problem 
But should DA instead be read as embracing the dilemma’s second horn? That is, perhaps it 
need not be committed to denying that the asteroid has a 0.5 probability of colliding with 
Earth after all. Here is an argument for this: 
 Let H = Doom-Now, and O = the observation of the approaching asteroid. Because 
DA thinks Doom-Now is very unlikely, our prior pr(H) is very low. This prior should then be 
updated in the light of the asteroid observation O: pr(H/O) = 0.5 (H/asteroid indeed strikes 
Earth) + 0.5 (H/asteroid misses Earth)= 0.5 (1) + 0.5 (prior pr(H)) = just over 0.5. Thus the 
calculated probability of Doom-Now is now (more or less) what the astronomers endorse. 
More to the point, DA has been incorporated via the low prior pr(H) and yet the calculation 
remains consistent with assigning a probability of 0.5 to the asteroid striking Earth. So the 
sharp contradiction with empirical science is avoided. 
 I return to this argument shortly, concluding that it should not be accepted at face 
value. But before that, I want to re-emphasise a separate but crucial point: even if this 
argument is accepted and thus the second horn embraced, that would be no salvation for DA. 
In particular, the original force of DA was that it compels us, by a priori reasoning, to revise 
probabilities derived from empirical evidence. If it does not do this then it is of little interest, 
because purely empirical investigation is confirmed to be sufficient after all. Therefore the 
successful replication by DA of the empirical probability could only be a pyrrhic victory. 
 
6. Which horn to embrace? 
It will be useful now to discuss the mathematical situation in more detail. In essence, we have 
two independent estimates of Doom-Now, one given by empirical considerations and one by 
DA considerations. How should we combine them? The crucial point is that, in general, we 
should not just assign them equal epistemic weight. Rather, we may justifiably have rather 
more confidence in one estimate than in the other. This particular issue does not seem to have 
been discussed in the DA literature explicitly but it is crucial here.  
 To illustrate, imagine we are estimating the probability that a (possibly biased) coin 
will come up Heads. Suppose that one estimate carries much less uncertainty than another, 
perhaps because it is based on a larger sample of previous tosses or because the witness to 
those tosses is more reliable. Then we should put greater weight on the more certain estimate. 
Similarly, when estimating the true state of public opinion we should put greater weight on an 
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opinion poll with a low sampling error than on one with a high error, and greater weight on 
one with a rigorous methodology over one with a more slipshod one.  
 It is uncontroversial that Bayesian procedure should take into account asymmetric 
uncertainty. Indeed, one of its virtues is precisely that it can. In particular, the uncertainty of a 
probability estimate may be represented by the relevant probability density function. A more 
certain estimate would have a sharp-peaked distribution around the estimate’s value, 
rendering that value relatively insensitive to new evidence. A less certain estimate, by 
contrast, would have a more diffuse distribution.
10
 
 Similarly, in statistical meta-analysis there are standard procedures for combining two 
independent estimates. One is to consider each estimate’s variance. In particular, an unbiased 
combined estimate (of the mean) can be achieved via inverse-variance weighting. Roughly, 
the higher an estimate’s variance, the more uncertain that estimate is, and so the less weight 
we should put on it.
11
 
 In the DA case, how we balance competing DA and empirical estimates of a 
probability turns – and must turn – on exactly this issue. Among other things, it determines 
which horn of the dilemma an advocate of DA should embrace. Some toy numbers will 
illustrate. By assumption, the empirical estimate of the asteroid collision’s probability, and 
thus of Doom-Now’s, is very certain. Suppose that the density function of that estimate is a 
normal distribution with a mean of 0.5 and, representing the scientists’ high degree of 
certainty, a small standard deviation of 0.001. Next, suppose initially that for DA the 
equivalent figures are a mean of 0.001 and the same small standard deviation of 0.001. In this 
case, because the two variances are the same, so an unbiased estimate of the mean would be 
midway between the two component estimates of it, i.e. midway between 0.5 and 0.001, i.e. 
approximately 0.25. So now DA would have modified the empirical estimate of Doom-
Now’s probability significantly, which corresponds to embracing the first horn of the 
dilemma.
12
 
 But is such a high degree of certainty about DA’s estimate justified? There are 
reasons to think not. It is true that DA’s Bayesian calculations of the ratios of posterior 
probabilities, such as in footnote 4 earlier, are sharp. But that is less true of those 
probabilities’ absolute values. These latter depend on many contested factors and 
assumptions, such as choice of reference class, the rate of future demographic growth, and 
the possibility of non-human intelligent species. For this reason, even among its advocates 
there is a consensus that the DA probabilities for the various Doom scenarios are not known 
exactly. This is implicit in the reluctance, from Leslie on, to give precise numerical values to 
DA’s predictions. It is implicit too in the universal concession that DA’s predictions should 
be modified by empirical considerations: given that in reality, as opposed to the Asteroid 
example, the relevant empirical probabilities are far from certain, the fact that they are still 
deemed weighty enough significantly to modify DA’s probabilities implies that the estimates 
of DA’s probabilities are themselves far from certain. For these reasons, we may conclude 
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2
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 ŷ =  Σi yi / σi
2
  
  Σi 1 / σi
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that the uncertainty of DA’s estimates is surely less than that of the scientists’ estimates in 
Asteroid. 
 Accordingly, we can calculate a second scenario, with new toy numbers. So, suppose 
as before that in Asteroid the density function of the empirical estimate is a normal 
distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a small standard deviation of 0.001. And this time, 
suppose that for DA the equivalent figures are still a mean of 0.001 but now, say, a standard 
deviation of 0.1, i.e. a hundredfold larger than before. Now the ratio of variances is therefore 
10,000:1, and accordingly in the inverse-variance weighting calculation the empirical 
estimate is given 10,000 times the weight of the DA one. Running through the numbers, this 
time the unbiased estimate for the mean is therefore 0.4999501 – in other words, almost 
indistinguishable from the scientists’ estimate of 0.5. This corresponds to DA embracing the 
second horn of the dilemma, in which it (almost) entirely fails to modify the empirical 
probability at all. 
 
7. From numbers to philosophy 
The above illustrates the mathematics of how DA and empirical probabilities should be 
combined. However, it is crucial to understand correctly such calculations’ philosophical 
significance – or otherwise. How do they fit into the overall argument? 
 The main thing to appreciate is that the calculations concern which horn of the 
dilemma should be embraced by a DA advocate. They do not necessarily capture the 
combined estimate of the probability that we should endorse. In fact, the heart of this paper’s 
philosophical argument is precisely that they do not. Rather, the trumping objection to DA 
applies regardless of the exact variance of DA’s estimate. Thus, in Asteroid, the correct 
probability estimate remains exactly 0.5 in all cases. 
 Below, I will argue that rationally we should ignore DA’s modification of the 
empirical probability, however big or small that modification is. In other words, no DA 
modification should be conceded, whether via the inverse-variance weighting rule or any 
other rule. To act on the preceding section’s calculations would therefore be a philosophical 
mistake, namely the mistake of thinking that the empirical estimates should be modified at 
all. The true importance of the certainty of the scientists’ estimate in Asteroid is not its 
impact on inverse-variance calculations but rather its role as an intuition pump. That is, the 
dialectical point of Asteroid is not that the certainty of its empirical estimate is what justifies 
this estimate’s supremacy; rather, it is that its certainty is what makes intuitively evident its 
supremacy. The trumping argument would still hold regardless. 
 Overall, the trumping argument thus holds regardless of the certainty of either the 
empirical or DA estimates. This is the sense in which the calculations in section 6 are 
philosophically beside the point. 
 Nevertheless, finally, there is a potential sting in the tail. For when the incorporation 
of DA is conceived of in a different way, there can arise a combination of circumstances in 
which the calculations above do become relevant again after all. At the end (section 10), we 
will see exactly how that can be, and how the overall dialectical landscape allows for this 
relevance sometimes even while denying it otherwise. 
 
8. Is the dilemma general? 
So Asteroid presents DA with a dilemma, but is this dilemma peculiar only to Asteroid or 
does it generalise? In particular, does the trumping argument generalise? Although 
modification of the empirically derived probability seems unacceptably counterintuitive in 
Asteroid, might it seem rather less so in cases where that probability is less sharp? And in 
practice DA is indeed usually applied to a case much less sharp than Asteroid – for, given 
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that no asteroid is actually coming, we are in fact rather uncertain of the empirical probability 
of humanity coming to extinction at any particular date. 
 To investigate, begin by tweaking Asteroid into a less sharp version. In particular, 
suppose that this time scientists are unsure of the probability that the asteroid will strike 
Earth, in other words that the relevant probability density function has a higher variance. 
Suppose nevertheless that the mean of this function is still 0.5. The key question is: would 
DA considerations now, unlike before, shift our rational estimate of pr(H) to below 0.5? 
Because the true probability of Doom-Now has become hazier to us, perhaps the tension 
between the DA modification and the empirical findings might seem correspondingly less 
serious. 
 But it seems to me that, on reflection, to endorse the DA adjustment here would be to 
go against the scientists’ recommendations just as unacceptably as in the original version of 
Asteroid. By assumption, the density function’s mean of 0.5 is empirically well founded. The 
only disanalogy with the original version is that its variance has increased. However, why 
should that make it any more rational to depart from its mean? Analogously, suppose we 
were estimating the probability that a coin will come up Heads, and doing so now on the 
basis of 10 previous tosses rather than on 100 previous tosses. The uncertainty of our estimate 
is thus increased, but why does it not remain equally irrational to deviate from whatever 
estimate the evidence yields us? The trumping problem still applies. Embracing the first horn 
of the dilemma remains as hard to justify in the less sharp as in the original version of 
Asteroid. 
 This conclusion is supported by running through for the new case the thought-
examples from the old one. Thus, imagine again identical physical situations with respect to 
asteroid collisions for Mars and Earth. Any DA modification would again imply that we 
nonetheless assign divergent collision probabilities, and this still seems unacceptable even 
when the empirically based estimates of these probabilities are subject to greater uncertainty. 
And in the quantum example, our mean guess would still be that the fatal outcome has a 
probability of 0.5. Given that this guess is the result of standard scientific methods supported 
by relevant background knowledge, any DA-inspired deviation from it would still imply 
deviation from well-supported empirical findings and ultimately therefore again a belief in 
miracles. 
 
9. The traditional case revisited 
Return now to the traditional presentation of DA (‘Traditional’), which focuses on the 
probabilities of Doom-Soon and Doom-Late rather than on that of Doom-Now. Should we 
accept that, influenced by DA, our estimates of these can reasonably deviate from those 
derived from (empirical) futurology alone? And thus, should we accept that there is in this 
respect a disanalogy between Traditional and Asteroid? If so, then in Traditional the 
dilemma’s first horn, i.e. trumping, would lose its force. 
 Initially, this escape route for DA might seem tempting. However, I do not think it is 
viable. The reason is that it relies on a dubious discontinuity claim. We saw above that the 
transition between the two versions of Asteroid – from sharp to less sharp – did not mitigate 
the unacceptability of DA-inspired modification of the empirical probability. Why should 
such a modification gain extra support just from the mere fact that the implications of 
empirical rationality are now a further degree more difficult to assess with certainty? To use 
DA to modify the empirical probabilities in Traditional is to go against scientists’ 
recommendations no less than it is in Asteroid. There is no extra space for DA to slip into. 
Here too, any deviation from our best empirical prediction, even when that prediction is 
uncertain, is implicitly to believe in miracles. To deny this continuity claim, defenders of DA 
would need to say where and why in the continuum of increasing uncertainty between 
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Asteroid and Traditional a deviation from empirical rationality, and thus belief in miracles, 
somehow becomes acceptable. 
 
10. DA priors – a different way out 
There remains a different line of defence for DA though. Suppose we imagine that DA sets 
our prior probability for some particular date of Doom, and that now we interpret ‘prior’ to 
mean before consideration of any empirical evidence at all.
13
 It is true that, numerically 
speaking, incorporating DA right at the start of our sequence of calculations would yield the 
same results as incorporating it at any other stage. Nevertheless philosophically speaking the 
difference is significant, this numerical equivalence notwithstanding. In particular, the a 
priori adjustment of empirical estimates falls foul of the trumping problem, but the a priori 
setting of priors does not. Thus, this (and only this) method of incorporating DA mathematics 
offers an escape route from our dilemma. In particular, it enables DA to embrace the 
dilemma’s first horn without any longer falling foul of trumping.14 Whether DA actually does 
so, turns on the mathematics from section 6, i.e. on the relative size of the empirical and DA 
uncertainties. Unlike earlier, those calculations are thus now philosophically relevant again. 
Let us go through them in the various cases. 
 First, in Asteroid, the certainty of the empirical probability of Doom-Now means that 
DA’s prior value for this probability is trumped by the new empirical evidence of the asteroid 
observation, just as earlier empirical observations are trumped too. So DA is still impotent. 
Next, what of the less sharp version of Asteroid? Now the trumping is no longer complete 
because the uncertainty about the empirical probability of Doom-Now opens the door for the 
DA-informed prior to retain some influence. Thus, in principle the posterior probability of 
Doom-Now could now take a value below 0.5 legitimately. As per section 6, how much it 
actually does so depends on the relative uncertainties. 
 We can also illustrate this possibility qualitatively, in terms of the Mars-Earth and 
quantum cases. First, to repeat, DA can be relevant only when there is uncertainty regarding 
the relevant empirical probability estimates. So, let us assume an otherwise analogous set of 
observations in the Mars and Earth asteroid cases, save that now these yield only rather 
uncertain estimates of the collision probabilities. As noted, in such circumstances a DA prior 
implies a lower probability of Doom-Now, and so a lower probability of an asteroid collision 
for Earth than for Mars. DA considerations thus make it more likely that the two situations 
are not physically identical, the similar observations notwithstanding. The impact of adding 
empirical uncertainty to the case is that the DA deviation created by our different priors for 
Mars and Earth is no longer automatically fully trumped. Similarly, in the quantum case, if 
(but only if) there is uncertainty regarding our 0.5 probability estimate, then that again creates 
room for DA – via the lingering influence of its priors – legitimately to shift our best guess 
about it to below 0.5 without implying any belief in miracles. 
 This line of defence of DA does still face a challenge though. It must stipulate, 
remember, that DA enters before any empirical evidence – otherwise the considerations in 
sections 8 and 9 kick in again. How does this impact, finally, on our analysis of Traditional? 
There, the DA-informed priors must by now have been modified by an enormous body of 
empirical evidence, indeed by every bit of evidence relevant to humanity’s future duration 
that has ever been gathered: all of our accumulated knowledge about humanity’s evolutionary 
history, the likely astronomical fate of Earth, the frequency of mass extinction events such as 
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supervolcanoes and asteroid collisions, the possibility of human self-extermination via war or 
some other cause, the feasibility of future colonization of other planets, and so on. A vast 
range of observations has contributed to this knowledge. This inevitably raises the suspicion 
that, numerically speaking, whatever priors DA bequeathed us have long since been 
overwhelmed, simply because the variance of an empirical estimate drawn from so many 
sources might be very low.
15
 If so, then DA would be rendered irrelevant and the second horn 
of the dilemma would apply again. Of course though, such a suspicion is difficult to prove – 
or equally to disprove – given that the relevant probability calculation is so intricate and 
enormous that it inevitably remains somewhat hypothetical.
16
 The point is that the fate of DA 
depends critically on the answer. 
 
11. Conclusion 
One’s opinion of the wider debate around DA will dictate how seriously one is willing to take 
it. But to the extent that one is so willing, this paper has shown how DA’s applicability is 
constrained – or, more positively, under what conditions it might be endorsed. In particular, it 
is illuminating to apply DA to the case of Doom-Now rather than to Doom-Soon versus 
Doom-Later, as this directs our attention to the two epistemically crucial factors: first, 
trumping; and second, the degree of certainty of our probability estimates. 
 In summary, the asteroid example creates a dilemma for DA: either it is committed to 
unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. This dilemma 
extends to a version of the asteroid example with uncertainty about the relevant probabilities, 
and thus by a continuity argument it extends too to the usual case to which DA is applied, 
namely the actual expected future duration of humanity. The only line of defence is to take 
DA as informing our initial beliefs regarding the date of humanity’s doom, prior to any 
empirical evidence on the matter at all. This defence is potentially sound in cases where the 
empirical probability is uncertain – but only in such cases. (Thus it already concedes DA’s 
helplessness in the original Asteroid example, for instance.) And even then, it requires in 
addition that the vast mass of empirical evidence to hand does not swamp the DA priors into 
irrelevance.
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 As noted in section 6, the literature seems implicitly to accept that, by contrast, the uncertainty of DA’s 
probability estimates is non-negligible, which is what opens the door to empirical swamping. 
16
 Leslie, End of the World, pp.201-2 calculates that DA should modify our credence in Doom-Early from 0.01 
to 0.5 or even to 0.99. But these and similar calculations in the literature are irrelevant here. The reason is that in 
effect they assume that the relevant estimates for the empirical and DA probabilities have equal uncertainties, 
and thus that DA can greatly impact our overall estimate. But given the vast number of observations 
underpinning the empirical estimate, this equality of uncertainty cannot just be assumed and indeed is precisely 
what is at issue. 
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